Sullivan’s versus Wilson’s Argument on Same-sex Marriage

Sullivan’s versus Wilson’s Argument on Same-sex Marriage

The issue of same-sex marriage is an ongoing, heated debate in the discourse community.  In support of same-sex marriage, Andrew Sullivan in his essay, “The Conservative Case,” challenges the traditionalists’ denunciation of homosexual marriage as something that undermines the natural function and sanctity of matrimony: He believes that regardless of one’s spouse’s gender, any intimately committed couples help stabilize human society on an emotional level and thus, on this ground, gay relationships should be deemed sacred and deserving of public respect and legal rights.  Yet, a traditionalist James Q. Wilson in his essay, “Against Homosexual Marriage,” unequivocally articulates that same-sex marriage will indeed destabilize the very cornerstone of our social structure: the heterosexual families that are endowed with the power to procreate and thereby contribute to nation-building in a very literal, physical sense.  It is obvious that the fundamental conflict between Sullivan and Wilson lies in their dichotomous interpretations of the function/purpose of human matrimony.  While Sullivan believes that the primary function of matrimony is to fulfill a “natural law” (457), which he defines as “every man’s entitlement to a caring companionship regardless of one’s partner’s sexuality/gender,” Wilson’s interpretation of marriage is grounded in a more traditional mores.  To Wilson, the foremost function of a marriage is to procreate and rear future citizens, and thus argues that the fact same-sex couples cannot on their own (biologically) produce children is an indicator that not only is same-sex marriage “unnatural,” but a “threat” to our predominantly heterosexual social order.  However, Sullivan and Wilson’s subjective moral debate based on their conflated notion of “human companionship” versus “marital procreation” lead to no practical solutions as it is; what we need, instead, is a shift in focus to objectively and civilly address legal issues pertaining to gay couples, such as their “monetary” (e.g., property, tax, inheritance) or “instrumental” (e.g., issuance of proxy) rights. 

Sullivan in his essay, “The Conservative Case,” articulates his support for same-sex marriage.  He avows that homosexuality is not inherently bad.  He further challenges the logic behind the fear of legalizing same-sex union—the publics’ concern that it would undermine the heterosexual families.  He argues that since conservatives (unlike prohibitionists) acknowledge the involuntary, biological nature of homosexuality in some of our societal members, “they must also concede that these persons are already part of ‘heterosexual’ families” (446).  In other words, homosexuals are intrinsically part of “us,” and thus they should not be set apart as “others” who pose as a threat to the heterosexual, social order.  Sullivan not only believes that same sex marriage is harmless to heterosexual society but he, in fact, encourages it for the very same reasons we encourage heterosexual marriages:  That is, if heterosexual marriage improves its participant’s psychological, physical, financial, and legal aspects, then, the same is/should be true for the homosexuals, ultimately contributing to the larger, national stability.  Hence, Sullivan pronounces that in any given society, citizens should be allowed “to combine a celebration of the traditional famil[ies] with the celebration of . . . stable homosexual relationship[s]” (450).

Contrary to Sullivan’s supportive stance, Wilson, on the other hand, opposes same-sex marriage.  Although he recognizes that not all marriages are perfect, he believes that they are, nonetheless, an institution that deserves our unqualified support, since procreation of our future citizens depend upon it.  He states that in terms of raising healthy children (our future citizens), “after much experimentation—several thousand years more or less—we have found nothing else that works as well.  Neither a gay nor a lesbian couple can of its own resources produce a child; another party must be involved” (459).  He then begs this question: “What do we call this third party?…There is no settled language for even describing, much less approving of, such persons” (459).  He deems “homosexual as a group [is] not ‘normal’ and “have tendency to be promiscuous” (460).  Wilson thus insists that we must preclude the possibility of some children being born into and raised by such potentially harmful, “radically different” (460) homosexual parents.  Wilson points out that if the notion that homosexual unions will destabilize heterosexual marriages cannot be proven on a literal level, neither is there any assurance that it will not on a psychosocial level of our future citizens.  

Although Sullivan and Wilson have opposing views on the issue of same-sex marriage, they do seem to acknowledge the sacredness of marriage as an institution.  In other words, as an institution, Sullivan and Wilson both praise marriage as something that foster responsibility and commitment.  What they differ is in deciding who deserves to partake of this sacred, institutional benefits and what should be the ultimate function of such a sacred institution.  For Sullivan, the ultimate function of a marriage is that it should endow the benefits of what he calls “natural law” (457)—that every man should have the care and support of other people.  He disagrees that the sacredness or psychosocial benefits of marriage are saved exclusively for the heterosexuals and demands a re-evaluation and/or re-contextualization of the biblical rhetoric against homosexuals.  For example, he argues that the passage in Leviticus, “If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death” (456) is historically out of context.  Though Sullivan concedes to the sanctity of matrimony, he objects to the traditionalists’ employment of the religious moral code to condemningly use it against the gay community.   

Irrespective of the gay community’s objections to the biblical moral codes, Wilson maintains that in terms of marriage, one fact—the fact that only heterosexual couples can procreate—is irreversible, timeless, and hence “the most natural,” biological infrastructure of humanity.  He reasons that although “Societies differ greatly in their attitude toward the income people may have, the relations among their various races, and the distribution of political power, they differ scarcely at all over the distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual couples” (458).  That is, that people naturally and “overwhelmingly prefer [heterosexual marriage] over the [other].  The reason, [he] believes, is that for most people, “marriage is…an institution created to sustain child-rearing” (459).  Although not all marriages produce and rear children, “its function,” Wilson says, “remains what has always been” (459). Thus, according to Wilson, since homosexual marriages cannot procreate future citizens, it is inherently unnatural and thus should not be encouraged, let alone be legitimized.

In regards to same-sex marriage, both Sullivan and Wilson, in my opinion, focus too exclusively on the issue of morality rather than civility and practicality.  If we look at it from a civil point of view, it is not too difficult to see that law should be impartial, regardless of one’s sexual orientation.  That is, same-sex couples should be entitled to the same legal rights as any other citizens, especially, in terms managing their private assets and health.  For example, instead of only acknowledging direct family members as having the rights to inheritance, people of homosexual relationship should be able to become heir to the property of his/her other partner, if that is so desired by the giver (an example of one’s monetary right).  Likewise, a terminally ill partner of an affectionate homosexual relationship should have the proxy rights, in terns of issuing guardianship of his/her own frail body to be taken care of by his/her same-sex partner (an example of one’s instrumental right).  First, however, since the notion that “same-sex marriage is wrong” runs deep in our cultural psyche, I believe that a compromise of some sort is in need to ensure their rights to manage both monetary and instrumental issues.  This compromise, in my opinion, is in the term “marriage.”  The term, “marriage” should not be applied to homosexual unions, simply because this word, for thousands of years, has been exclusively designated for heterosexual matrimony.  Instead of hopelessly trying to erase this age old mores, I suggest a different term for same-sex cohabitations, perhaps even calling it a “civil union” of the same-sex.  By ascribing a separate terminology, heterosexual marriage will not be offended nor be threatened by the homosexual unions demanding the same type of legal benefits of residing together, sharing financial, health, and other responsibilities as committed couples.  To rephrase it in legal context, regardless of whether our society approves of same-sex marriage, being mindful of the fact that homosexuals have the same civil rights as any other citizens can help us redirect our debates into something that initiates practical laws that protect (not exploit) their monetary and instrumental rights.  

Although Sullivan and Wilson have opposite views on the issue of same-sex marriage, they similarly believe in the sacredness of marriage as an institution.  The fundamental difference lies in their contradicting interpretation of the function and/or purpose of human matrimony.  While Sullivan believes that the function of a marriage is to fulfill what he calls a “natural law”—a right to a loving companionship that is indiscriminate to one’s sexual orientation—Wilson believes that a marriage is an exclusive entitlement for heterosexual couples who contribute to nation-building in a physical sense, the procreation of our future citizens.  However, such subjective moral disputes can only lead to inconclusive arbitrations at best, and thus call for a more practical approach in order to find implemental resolutions in terms of gay couples’ civil rights:  While our society may not validate a same-sex cohabitation as a legally binding matrimony, we can confer them certain legal measures which afford them the prerogative to manage their monetary (property, tax, inheritance, and such) and/or instrumental matters (e.g., the issuance of proxy in lieu of one’s same-sex partner, especially in times of sickness).  Perhaps by re-inscribing the term “marriage” which is imbued with heterosexual connotations into something less territorial and incendiary like “civil union,” per se, for homosexual relationships, we might be able to mitigate this polarized issue towards a tangible resolution.  However, before we can discuss any such tangible measure, our discourses on the matter need to shift its focus from morality to civility.   

Works Cited

Sullivan, Andrew. “The Conservative Case.” Contemporary Moral Issues in a Diverse Society.        McDonald Julie M. Wadsworth: Belmont, 1998. 446-450.

Wilson, James Q. “Against Homosexual Marriage.” Contemporary Moral Issues in a Diverse    Society. McDonald Julie M. Wadsworth: Belmont, 1998. 454-461.