Why I Disagree with Both Leroi’s and Thomas’s Definition of “Race”

 Part I

         “The billion or so of the world’s people of largely European descent have a set of genetic variants  in common that are collectively rare in everyone else; they are a race.  At a smaller scale, three million Basques do as well; so they are a race as well.  Race is merely a shorthand that enables us to speak sensibly, though with no great precision, about genetic rather than cultural or political differences.”

—Armand Leroi, The New York Times 3/14/05

I disagree with Armand Leroi’s above comment.  It is scientifically inconclusive to say that race is biologically based.  However, I do recognize that race can serve as an important indicator that allows us to gain a better understanding of differences that exist among the different groups of people, such as the prevalence of certain diseases in some races but not in others.  Yet, I find Leroi’s statement to be problematic for two reasons:  First, the premise of his study is inflated and not holistic, in that the range of genetic differential that he attempts to categorize as different racial types of humans cannot exceed .01%, since according to human genome film, Homo sapiens are 99.9% genetically identical.  Second, his theory of genetic racialization is based on an inconstant and fluctuating sample of human genes.  That is, his sample base of human genes are not stable enough to make a scientific claim, in that Homo sapiens always have been, is in the process of, and will continue to be subject to evolution which involve the following unpredictable and incalculable forces: (1) external/natural environment, like climate, gene flow, and genetic drift; (2) internal/biological environment, like mutations, endemics, and blood types; (3) cultural behavior, such as various breeding patterns, migrations, diet, and beliefs. 

Bluntly put, Leroi’s scientific claim about human variation at genetic level is not based on precision over the whole population.  For instance, though the discovery of DNA has revealed human diversity with greater precision, virtually no one genotype is exclusive to one race.  For example, according to Molnar, though African-Americans show a higher frequency of sickle-cell genes, other ethnic groups also display sickle-cell genes, and they are categorized into different geographical types as they are found in locations such as Senegal, Benin, Bantu, and Asia (Molnar 162).  Also, in England, within one race of blood type-A patients who are afflicted with stomach cancer, a study of the frequency of this disease “revealed a difference between regions:  The mortality rate was higher in the North than in the South,” depending on other elements of people’s blood type (Molnar 99).  In other words, in this case of stomach cancer in England, racial type was not an indicator of why some have cancer and why some don’t.  Race is but one element of infinite number of other factors that determine the susceptibility of certain biological difference at a genetic level.  In other words, to borrow Alan Goodman’s term in his essay “Two Questions About Race” (2005), Leroi, as a scientist, is making a grave error because his concept of “genes as an indicator of different race” is based on a “shifting concept” (Goodman 3).  Goodman further critiques that Leroi “tends to forget about the 94% of variation that race fails to statistically explain (Goodman 3).  Rather, Goodman says that “race is an inherently unstable and unreliable concept, [which may be] . . . fine for local realities but not so for a scientific concept” (Goodman 3).  If, within this .01% of biological variability, certain traits are more common in one group of people than others, Leroi exaggerates this variability and postulates this tendency out of context as being a significant indicator of race disparity. 

Unlike Leroi, Molnar, on the other hand, believes that “study of biology forces us to reject perceptions of superficial differences, many of which are due to factors of nutrition, child growth, and climate” (Molnar 2).  In terms of nutrition and child growth as factors, I have personally noticed a change in appearance of Koreans brought up in US versus my other relatives who have never left Korea.  Korean immigrants in US more or less adopt American diet.  Consequently, unlike their relatives in Korea, Korean immigrants of US drink more milk and eat more pizza like the mainstream Americans.  This change in environmental and behavioral factors, in turn, affect genetic expression of the growth hormones in Korean immigrants’ children: Higher intake of dairy products causes their children to grow taller and stronger than their relatives in Korea.  As I am not a scientist, though I cannot validate my aforementioned hypothesis—that higher intake of dairy products produce taller people—Molnar cites cases in which diet seems to be a significant element in genetic makeup:  First, according to Molnar, Cross-culturally, and particularly in Asia, Africa, and in many European countries, more adults, opposed to infants, are classified as mal-absorbers of milk, because adults drink less or no milk compared to infants (Molnar 129).  However, a large percentage of adults in North America and pastoral tribes in East Africa are classified as absorbers due to their more exposure to dairy products (Molnar 129).  Thus, Molnar says that “milk-using experience . . .contribute[s] to high frequency of the gene for adult lactase persistence in some peoples of the world” (Molnar 129). 

Not only culturally specific “diet” affects human genome, but culturally particular “belief/behavior” also plays a role in genetic frequency.  For instance, albinism  type II, tyrosinase positive, is most frequently seen in Africans and Native Americans (Molnar 126).  One explanation for this phenomenon in one group—at least in the Native Americans—can be traced back to their cultural proclivity to the spread of Albinism:  In their culture, Albino males are treated well, doing lighter domestic jobs with women at home, which increase their prospect of mating and thus the chance of procreating more albinos (Miller, lecture).  In terms of both lactose tolerance and albinism, then, culturally particular human behavior—such as diet and sexuality—affect human diversity at a biological level.

 According to Molnar, climate is another indicator of human diversity.  For example, one type of protein called Haptoglobins (Hp1) which “have the capacity to combine with the oxygen-carrying pigment, hemoglobin” has the highest frequency in tropical locations (Molnar 120).  Molnar says that this is probably due to the fact that “this Haptoglobin (Hp1) type would be an advantage in populations where hemolytic anemia is very high”: the tropical areas (Molnar 121).  Another example of climate as an indicator of human diversity is that, though there are numerous exceptions, in general, “taller people [are] farther from the equator (as in northwestern European) and shorter people nearer [to] the equator” (Molnar 181).  Likewise, people are fatter and lighter in the northern cold regions versus their thinner darker counterparts in the warm humid areas (Molnar 186).  Even the various head sizes of human show correlation with the climate: In colder climates, the people on the average have “rounder heads than peoples in the tropics,” as “surface area and volume is a critical factor in heat radiation to regulate body temperature” (Molnar 188, 9).  Also, in terms of heat radiation/heat conservation, Homo sapiens’ other body parts like arms, legs, facial features, teeth, and hair are affected by climate, ultimately increasing the multiplicity and individuality of Homo sapiens, though within the .01% of human variation.  Most crucially, however, these milliard differences in human are merely correlations between climate and human variation; they are tendencies, not facts. Thus, any observation and assumptions about the phenotypical variation in humans—however genetically detailed the data may be—still do not stand as facts.  Ultimately, then, the very idea, such as that of Leroi’s—that humans are divisible into few racial types by observing their genes—is problematic, as many precursors to genetic difference, like climate cannot be measured by scientific methods.

Molnar explains that in any given population, studying its gene pool and frequencies are affected and shaped by other immeasurable factors such as “mutation,” “natural selection,” “genetic drift,” and “gene flow” (Molnar 56).  Mutation not only causes change in genetic codes but introduces a new variety of allele, increasing the number of different genotypes/phenotypes within a population (Molnar 59).  It is often driven by humans’ natural biological tendency to adapt, known as “natural selection” (Molnar 60).  For instance, polymorphism shown in human blood types is often a result of natural selection.  An allele such as Hbs, which is advantageous under harsh slavery conditions, for example, “appears more in several populations in Africa,” theoretically due to natural selection (Molnar 146).   Although its high frequency in several parts of India is hard to explain, at least in eastern Nigeria, it seems that this Hbs gene frequency was “spread by population migration and interpopulation contact, . . . because of its selective advantage” (Molnar 148).  The effect of natural selection is also seen in malarial cases—a widespread disease in mostly tropical areas.  For example, abnormal hemoglobin SCT are less able to support malarial parasite growth, and thus natural selection favors individuals with SCT, in that they are less likely to die from falciparum malaria than persons with all normal hemoglobin (Molnar 150).  The point is, how in the world Leroi can scientifically factor these natural phenomena into his truth claim—the genetic human variation?  Human variation, though parts of its aspects may be recognizable at genetic level, its holistic picture is impossible to neatly grasp, because human genes will be different tomorrow than what they are today; they are inconstant; they mutate. 

Gene flow and genetic drift are other random human social phenomena which forestall any human attempts to categorize genes into few racial types.  According to Molnar, “gene flow refers to exchanges between different population gene pools so that the next generation is a result of admixture” (Molnar 63).  Over the human history, Molnar says that invaders, colonists, travelers, and traders have all collectively contributed to this gene flow phenomenon (Molnar 63).  Thus, throughout the human history, this high rate of admixture, the phenomenon that is accelerating in our contemporary world, has been an important factor which prevents the development of unique gene combinations.  Evidence of diversification of genes due to gene flow can be seen in the case of sickle-cell traits in black populations.  According to Molnar, African-Americans in the US have, on average, less than one-fourth to one-half of the Hbs found among West African populations today (5-10 percent versus 20 percent)” (Molnar 160).  He says that “this reduction, occurring over the three-and-a-half centuries of their occupation in the New World. . . may be accounted for either by admixture with Euro-Americans or by an elimination of the selective advantage of the carrier of the sickle-cell trait.” (161).  On the other hand, Molnar states that Genetic Drift indirectly influences the course and intensity of natural selection, in that when a breeding population is too small, there is a possibility that not all gene combinations will be represented in the next generation—so called a “sampling error” (Molnar 64).  In short, smaller the population sample, higher the rate of gene frequency change between the generations (Molnar 65).  Thus, population size is another unmanageable, irregular factor which scientists like Leroi cannot accurately assess in analyzing human variation. 

   In conclusion, according to  Molnar, “the record of DNA markers tell us little about how we gained certain of these complex traits—how we acquire a certain size and appearance, a skin color, or rates of growth” (Molnar 179).  Molnar has also warned against scientists like Leroi, in that he says that “no matter how we may define or classify clusters of populations today, their composition will undoubtedly change over future generations, as a result of major alterations in evolutionary forces through human adaptation and because of continuing migrations and interbreeding,” which, I might add, has increased rapidly in our contemporary world (Molnar 2).  Likewise, Alan Goodman in his essay “Two Questions About Race” (2005) says that “we just don’t know” enough about human genes to make such a conclusive scientific claim.  Rather, human diversity is better explained in terms of “evolution and history” (Goodman 3).  Because Homo sapiens consist of enormous range of physical variability, any scheme to divide humanity into a few racial types is bound to be fallacious and misleading (Miller, lectures).  Thus, when Armand Leroi claims that race is genotypically distinguishable, he is—according to the human genome film—arguing and exaggerating the difference he sees within the narrow zone of .01% variability among different peoples, since cross-racially, humans are 99.9% genetically identical.

Part II

“Instead of obsessing about race, we could try to build a race-blind society.  Instead of feeding      the fires of neuroticism, we could start teaching people to forget about race, to move on.  But to   do that, first we must sideline the entire race relations industry—whose only function, it seems, is    to make us all deeply anxious about ‘race’—a concept they simultaneously believe has no objective reality.  “

 —Sean Thomas, Sunday Telegraph (London) 3/13/05

I also disagree with Sean Thomas’s above comment.  I find the idea behind it to be, well, wishful thinking at best.  To be “race-blind” means what?: that we forget the history of racial oppression which is so embedded in the collective unconscious?; that we do not recognize the multicultural reality of the United States?;  that we adhere to one set of ideas about American culture?;  if so, whose?  The phrase, “move on” is a phrase that Ralph Ellison has mocked in his Invisible Man.  There are people who actually fear remembrance of history and a culturally pluralistic society.  I suspect that this is what is behind Thomas’s message.

For one, the effects of imperialist colonialism of the past still linger among us.  Take India, for example, Eurocentric colonial nation building left ethnic strife among the colonized.  According to Kottak, “over a million Hindus and Muslims were killed in the violence that accompanied the division of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan” (Kottak 82).  Similarly, “problems between Arabs and Jews in Palestine began during the British mandate period” (Kottak 82).  Moreover, during WW II, both Canada and US ordered expulsion of Japanese from their mainstream centers (Japanese internment).  In the history of a young nation of merely 200 some years, US has enforced numerous discriminatory immigration and property laws against those other than “white”—e.g., Chinese exclusionary Act, to name just one.  Thus, contrary to what Thomas suggests, race is not something that can be “[taught to] to forget. . . [and] move on,” because it has, it does, and it continues to affect the people of color in enormous and powerful ways.

The effect of racism is inscripted in both collective consciousness and in real life of colored people.  For instance, not only in US, but world-wide, people with darker pigmentation are the poorest (Miller, professor).  In US alone, more people of color, particularly, blacks and Latinos, are disproportionately incarcerated.  They are paid the least.  They live in and their children go to worst schools.  They are thus the least likely to succeed physically, intellectually, economically, and politically.  Their sociopolitical odds, then, are enormous.  In short, it affects every aspect of a colored person’s life: wealth, education, career, health, and the list can go on. 

Now, I would like to discuss about my personal observation/experience with racism in higher education.  Because the nature of my discussion is somewhat theoretical and subtle, before I immerse into my argument against intellectual racism within the canonical circle of Western countries, US in particular, I would like to first reiterate Kottak’s definition of racism:  According to Kottak, “when an ethnic group is assumed to have a biological basis, it is called a race.  Discrimination against such a group is called racism” (Kottak 67, emphasis added).  Well, what I have observed is that this racism against ethnic group exists even in the intellectual community, namely, among the canonizers—those who compile textbooks of higher educations.  For the purpose of this essay, I call this a “canonical racism”—the racism of anthologizers against works of ethnic writers. 

Until recently, the inclusion into or the exclusion from the Western canon was dependent upon the work’s “familiarity” and/or “durability” within the dominant culture.  Although canon debates by their very exclusionary nature can never please all sides, traditionally, they have systematically marginalized literary works of ethnic writers.  Perhaps, Samuel Johnson’s observation still holds true today: that “the reverence due to writings that have long subsisted arise…not from any credulous confidence in the superior wisdom of past ages,…but is the consequence of acknowledged and indubitable positions, that what has been longest known has been most considered, and what is most considered is best understood” (230, emphasis added).  What Johnson’s theory is implying is that what survives as “revered” (the canonized) literature owes to its “indubitable positions” (the positions of white males) within the literary circles.

For example, a decade ago, in 1995, an Asian Diaspora who was raised in America since the age of three wrote a novel claiming numerous awards, to name just one from the long list is the Hemingway Foundation/Pen Award.  Most memorably, for his novel Native Speaker, he was selected by the New Yorker as one of the twenty best “American writers” under forty.  This “American,” or should I say “Korean-American,” is Chang Rae Lee.  However, his book, Native Speaker, though he won “the twenty best American writers under forty” award, was automatically labeled under the “minor literature” in a separate American canon, because according to Deleuze and Guattari, Lee’s Native Speaker fits the definition of “minor literature”: work of a minority writer in a major language (English).  The value of this incidence for my argument is that it illustrates what I mean by canonical racism in intellectual community in US. Frankly, I believe that none of this labeling business should be espoused in the process of anthology.  If a writer is an American, then, s/he is singularly American, and his/her work is singularly an American literature.  No prefixes such as “Afro,” “Asian,” “Latino,” nor qualifiers such as “minor” or “ethnic” is needed, unless the canon is willing to equally dissect the entire culturally hybrid, transnational writers of America. 

Pertinent to canonical racism is an essay called “The More Things Change: Paradigm Shifts in Asian American Studies” written by Sumida Stephen.  Stephen, in his essay, informs that “for about a decade the critique of Asian American ‘dual identity’ empowered Asian American studies with the contravening idea that it is the concept of ‘America’ that needs to be changed so that it is understood that Asian Americans are singularly American” (Sumida 1).  In the past, if silent submissive Asian Americans can be effortlessly alienated (e.g., Japanese internment and Chinese exclusionary Act) on the basis of “phenotypically/culturally being more foreign than others”—thus requiring qualifiers and prefixes describing what type of American they are—now, such systemized alienation are no longer feasible.  With the coming-of-age of children of the Asian Diasporas, who may be the future writers/scholars, who have grown up in America, and who are mentally, culturally, and legally “Americans,” need to be dealt with.  Surely, it is inevitable that the canon debates in the U.S., in the very near future, will have to re-examine the concept of “American” in categorizing the works written by Asian Americans, and by extension, other prefixed half-Americans. 

John Guillory in “The Canon as Cultural capital,” says that much of the canonical debates stem from racist nationalism.  In his essay, Guillory states that “the ‘West’ was always the creation of nationalism,” and critiques that Western universities are involved in the discriminatory “project of constituting a national culture” largely through the process of canonization (222).  According to Guillory, the method of sustaining what he calls the West’s “imaginary cultural continuities” begins with the assumed Eurocentric superiority, weighing what is culturally “Western” more principally into the canon, while subordinating or excluding literature that represents the “other.”  Thus, in this nationalistic milieu of the Western canon, ethnographic works are often pushed out as “not [representing] our culture” (222).  However, Guillory warns that “the very distinctness of cultures, Western or non-Western, canonical or noncanonical, points to a certain insistent error…in the supposed transmission of culture” through literature (223), because the very idea of “cultural homogeneity” is an illusion—a “fiction” (221). 

Similarly, the chief spokesperson of subaltern studies, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in her essay, “Imperialism and Sexual Difference,” requests accurate, not distorted, representation of women of color in Eurocentric literature.  For example, in many literatures written by Western writers, women of color are portrayed as physically, intellectually, and culturally inferior—e.g., they are usually a slave, maid, prostitute, or mentally insane (like Rochester’s wife from Jamaica in Jane Eyre).  She challenges Western academia to stop misrepresenting the women of the third world by first deconstructing the tropological truth-claim made by the imperial masculists, meaning that this cultural violation stems from the fact that Western academia insists “the white race as a norm for universal humanity” (340).  Particularly, what troubles Spivak the most is that this cultural violation—committed by the Western male and female elitists—perpetuates through cultural ignorance of the teachers to their students, which she describes it as the “sanctioned ignorance” (345).  In order to avoid sanctioned ignorance, then, their misrepresented history written by the Eurocentric writers must be re-represented/revised; however this cannot happen without the “equal access” in the canon (347).

Like Spivak, critics like Bhabha also demands equal representation of the postcolonial cultural hybridity written by diasporas and other ethnic minorities.  He says, “The Western metropole must confront its postcolonial history, told by its influx of postwar migrants and refugees, as an indigenous or native narrative internal to its national identity” (1335, emphasis added).  He proposes that “the centre of …[our] study would [no longer] be the “sovereignty” of national cultures, nor the universalism of human cultures, but a focus on those ‘freaks’ of social and cultural displacements,”’ meaning minorities (1340).  He asks the Western canon to endow equal access into their literary circles those who in the past have been perceived as “freaks” by the dominant culture.

In conclusion, just as my personal observation of canonical racism illustrates, even though race makes little sense on the genetic level, this does not mean that it is not real in a social sense.  Thus, Tomas’s notion of a “race-blind” society is naive.  Other than teaching people to treat others as individuals and not collectively as a race or group, how do you create a “race-blind” society?  It is just not possible.  Perhaps I’m pessimistic, but it’s a utopian ideal that is not realistic.  Moreover, what does he mean by the “race relations” industry? It seems to me that the only people who obsess about race as an issue and are anxious about it are those who feel the need to overlook race.  As I have mentioned in my introduction of my first essay, race can be an important indicator and an important measurement to gain a greater understanding of other groups of individuals, not only biologically to cure diseases, but to improve our social conditions.  However, to create this race-blind society is to argue that there are no differences among us.  It is only through open dialogue (e.g., in intellectual community) not by pretending that all of us could be “race-blind,” that we can “move on” towards racial equality (Thomas 2005). 

Works Cited

Bhabba, Homi. “Locations of Culture.” The Critical Tradition. Richter, David H. Boston:

       Bedford Books, 1989.

Gilles, Deleuze, and Guattari, Felix. “What Is a Minor Literature?” Falling into Theory. Richter,

        David H. Boston:

Goodman, Alan. “Two Questions About Race” 20 April 2005

        <http://raceandgenomics.ssrc.org/Goodman&gt;

Guillory, John. “The Canon as Cultural Capital.” Falling into Theory. Richter, David H. Boston:

        Bedford Books, 2000

Johnson, Samuel. “Preface to Shakespeare.” The Critical Tradition. Richter, David H.

         Boston: Bedford Books, 1989.

Kottak, Conrad Phillip. On Being Different. 2 Boston: McGraw Hill, 2003.

Lee, Chang Rae. Native Speaker. New York: Riverhead Books, 1995.

Molnar, Stephen. Human Variation: Races, Types, and Ethnic Groups. 5 New Jersey: Prentice Hall,

          2002.

Spivak, Gayatri. “Imperialism and Sexual Difference.” Falling into Theory. Richter, David H.

         Boston: Bedford Books, 2000.

Sumida, Stephen H. “The More Things Change: Paradigm Shifts in Asian American Studies.”

         American Studies International 38 (2000): 97-114.

.

Rivalry relation between Jane in Charlotte Brontë’s “Jane Eyre” and Bertha in Jean Rhys’s “Wide Sargasso Sea”

Rivalry relation between

Jane in Charlotte Brontë’s “Jane Eyre” and Bertha in Jean Rhys’s “Wide Sargasso Sea”

Adrienne Rich in “Jan Eyre: The Temptations of a Motherless Woman” articulates that “Jane Eyre, motherless and economically powerless” has successfully resisted “certain traditional female temptations” with dignity (470).  Rich quotes from Phyllis Chesler’s essay called the “Women and Madness” to explicate what she means by “motherless woman”: Rich explains that women for generations “have had neither power nor wealth to hand on to their daughters [because] they have been dependent on men as children are on women” (470).  Therefore, Rich says that for a woman to secure herself financially, she is left with one option: women must learn to “pleas[e] and attach themselves to, powerful or economically viable men” (470).  In Rich’s opinion, what makes Jane Eyre so different and admirable is the fact that she does not “please and attach” herself to a powerful or economically viable men in order to fare well.  Though she is an orphan, who is in need of financial support, Jane never compromises morality, self-respect, and dignity.

Adrienne Rich further lists four major temptations in Jane’s life which she courageously overcomes: (1) the temptation of victimization; (2) the thrill of masochism; (3) the temptation of romantic love and surrender; and (4) the deepest lure for a spiritual woman.  First, Jane’s “temptation of victimization” occurs when she lives with the Reeds (her Aunt), “a hostile household, where both psychic and physical violence are used against her” (471).  Though the insults and abuses she suffer from them are enough to diminish “her very spiritedness and individuality,” she manages to come out of this situation with her self-respect intact.  Secondly, “the temptation of masochism” springs from Jane’s deep affection and respect for Helen who is religious, forgiving, and ultimately masochistic.  However, Jane soon realizes that “the thrill of masochism is not for her, though it is one of her temptations” (474).  Thirdly, “the temptation of romantic love and surrender” comes to Jane at Thornfield, as she falls in love with Rochester and decides to marry him.  On the wedding day, however, it is reveled that Rochester has a living wife—a mad woman, Bertha.  Not only is it against Jane’s high moral to become Rochester’s mistress, but more implicitly, she flees from the risk of “becoming this [mad] woman” herself by marrying him (476).  Lastly, Jane’s final temptation which comes from St. John is the “most confusing temptation,” because it is “the deepest lure for a spiritual woman” (480).  As St. John offers her marriage without love which is instead filled with a spiritual sense of “duty and service to a cause” in India as a missionary couple, Jane, upon serious contemplation, rejects this offer (480).  Rich ultimately believes that it is Jane’s strong sense of morality, self-respect, and dignity that saves her from the usual trap and temptations of a motherless woman.

Although I agree with Adrienne Rich on most of her points about Jane Eyre, I take issue with her concluding comment of her essay, in which she states that “In Jane Eyre,…we find an alternative to the stereotypical rivalry of women” (482).  Rich believes that the women in the novel are supportive to one another, and they are “not…points on a triangle…as temporary substitutes for men” (482).  Though it is true that Jane and many of the women in the novel is supportive to one another, what Rich is neglecting with this comment is that she is completely overlooking the fact that the relationship between Jane Eyre and Bertha Mason is a relationship of “rivalry,” and these two women are the “points on a triangle” with one man— Rochester.  If Rich assumes that Jane’s relationship with Bertha is non-rivalry because that is how it is depicted by Bronte, then, she is complicit with Bronte for grossly misrepresenting and symbolically oppressing the women of color in Eurocentric literature written by feminist of the first world.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in “Imperialism and Sexual Difference” critiques that the feminists of the first world—such as Bronte and Rich—are complicit with the racist masculist of universalism, and asks that the female writers and critics to stop perpetuating the “racism within feminism” (347).  Spivak states that a novel like Jane Eyre commits “translation-as-violation,” because Bronte writes about woman of the third world (Bertha Mason) when she is “total[ly] ignoran[t] of history and subject constitution” of that world and its women (344).  Spivak says that such ignorance on the part of the first world feminist like Bronte is not only insensitive and arrogant—in that they assume their feminist paradigm is universal—but is also misleading because the distorted representation of the women of color, often as lunatics (like Bertha), becomes a generalized stereotype on the minds of their readers.

Spivaks fear of “translation-as-violation” committed by the first world feminists must have been comforted by Jean Rhys, who sympathetically reconstructs Bertha Mason in her novel, Wide Sargasso Sea, as a character who is victimized by Rochester.  While Adrienne Rich convincingly depicts the motherless Jane Eyre as an exceptional heroine who has resisted moral temptations in the world of patriarchy, Jean Rhys in her novel sympathetically reveals how Bertha not only became motherless, but why she became, fatherless, husbandless, childless, friendless, and penniless under the patriarch Rochester—the man Jane wins as a reward for her high morals.  Thus, though Adrienne Rich exalts Jane’s high morality and dignity, Jean Rhys novel, Wide Sargasso Sea, which is written from Bertha’s point of view, helps us see that these two women are the “points on a triangle” with one man, Rochester, and thus are rivals to one another.

Works Cited

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Imperialism and Sexual Differnce.” Falling into Theory. Richter,

David H. 2 ed. Boston:Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000.

Rich, Adrienne. “Jane Eyre: The Temptations of a Motherless Woman.” Jane Eyre. Charlotte

Bronte. New York: Norton & Co., 2001.

Rhys, Jean. Wide Sargasso Sea. New York: Norton & Co., 1999.

The Happy Endings of Fairy Tales That Are Defined By Men

The happy and victorious endings of the many fairy tales, on the surface, suggest to the young female readers that if one is true to oneself, and endure to the end, that virtue will be rewarded, evil punished.  Beneath the celebratory mood of the triumphant endings, however, there are unsettling facts for women readers, namely, that men’s sexual desires and their definitions of female beauty have direct implications on whether the protagonists will suffer or be redeemed as virtuous women. 

Indeed, in many of the stories, it is the sexual desire of the protagonist’s father, who either by desiring to be re-married or by remarrying, brings severe afflictions to his daughter.  For instance, in both Brothers Grimm’s and Lin Lan’s Cinderella stories, the intervention of stepmothers and stepsisters via fathers’ remarriages mark the beginning of the protagonists’ wretched states that test their patience and virtues. 

On the other hand, in both Perrault’s “Donkeyskin” and “The Princess in the Suit of Leather,” the protagonists’ fathers’ uncontrollable, carnal desires to be remarried not only lead to incestuous schemes against their own daughters, but also instigate the ensuing miseries in their daughters lives.  If fathers’ “burning” (110) and “mad” (110) libidinous desires are responsible for their daughters’ dire predicaments, the sexual “desires” (113) and tastes of the princes and other male suitors dictate whether they will ignore or mercifully lend a hand to these innocent female victims. 

Donkeyskin, for example, if she did not conveniently fit into the prince’s (male) definition of beauty, would have indefinitely remained in a wretched state, “laugh[ed] and shouted” (115) at by everyone as “that dirty little fright” (115).  We learn why the prince decides to save Donkeyskin from her plight: “while he was gazing at her [Donkeyskin’s]…lovely profile, her warm, ivory skin, her fine features, and her fresh youthfulness” (113), was “at the mercy of his desires [that] he almost lost his breath” (113). 

In fact, Donkeyskin, well aware of the exterior qualities that men seek in women, “insisted that she [have] some time to change her clothes before appearing before her lord and master” (115), who holds the ultimate power to redeem and reinstate her as once more a princess.  Thus, the happy endings of many fairy tales subliminally suggest that it is largely the women’s physical/sexual qualities in the eyes of the libidinous males that ultimately dictate the virtues/fates of women.

The ending of Charles Perrault’s “Little Red Riding Hood”

The ending of Charles Perrault’s Little Red Riding Hood, that “the wicked wolf…gobbled her [Little Red Riding Hood] up” (13), is shocking because the girl’s only guilt here is her innocence.  The story’s brevity and simplicity magnify the psychological shock that the reader suffers from its ending – the grim finality of “the prettiest” village girl, “who did not know that it was dangerous to stop and listen to wolves” (12).  By using wolf as a metaphor for “the public world” (versus the private home), Perrault’s message with the story is unequivocal: the world outside home is dangerous for little girls.    The fact that this strategic, murderous wolf represents a male in the public domain not only limits female’s public space out of sheer fear factor, it also intimates female inferiority and her foreseeable doom in the public world.  succinctly, the story empowers men, not women.  Therefore, as a woman, I appreciated the other versions that empower women, not men.  Especially, Thurber’s The Little Girl and the Wolf, though considerably alters the literary value of the original text, was comical and entertaining.

Literary Critique:Scott Juengel,s “Face, Figure, Physiognomics: Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein and The Moving Image”

Literary Critique of:

Juengel, Scott. “Face, Figure, Physiognomics: Mary Shelly’s Frankenstein and The Moving Image.” A Forum on Fiction: 33 (2000 Summer): 353-76

 

Juengel argues that physiognomic determinism is deployed in Shelley’s Frankenstein.  He believes that the governing logic of physiognomics of the day (which was heavily influenced by Lavater’s physiognomy) is implicated in Frankenstein through the “circulating, miniature portrait” of the protagonist’s mother that seems to herald the deaths of Frankenstein’s mother, brother (William), and Justin.  He further argues that the monster’s hunting gaze in the two scenes by the window also casts him as an “image of moving portraiture” since it is this horrid image that Frankenstein runs for/away from that which ultimately causes his death.  Lastly, he questions the ethics of physiognomic determinism in Frankenstein, and believes that the novel interrogates this issue itself by illuminating how the monster’s hunting visage thwarts any descent, intersubjective relationship between the creator (Victor) and his creature (monster).

Although Juengel’s essay is insightful and convincing, I take issue with his occasional, obscure use of the term “physiognomics.”  Juengel quotes Lavater’s theory of physiognomics extensively to lay out the meaning of physiognomics, however, his essay, in large, does not follow this precept in the strict sense, and thereby confuses the reader in grasping his central points.  For instance, his main points of the essay are more about the devastating effects of this “moving image of portraiture” (the picture of Victor’s mother and the monster’s gaze framed by the window), rather than about the cause and effects of physiognomic determinism (showing how the specific facial features of the monster mirror his character, or presage future events according to Lavater’s theory). 

Juengel does, however, persuasively argue that monster’s conspicuously structured body from the corpses  – “the construction of living from the dead” which Juengel defines as an act of “prosopopeia” – foreshadows iconoclastic fate of his mate’s unfinished, destroyed body.  He also does an excellent job of convincing that portraits, specifically, close-ups of human face, have “talismanic” or “fetishistic” power over the beholder because they force the gazer to confront, acknowledge, and linger over an imagined face; but more significantly, because they freeze the image of a moving, living person as static and inanimate, symbolizing death.  His final argument, the “ethics of physiognomy,” claims that the immediacy of “face-to-face tableau” – the exchange of monster’s and Frankenstein’s gaze in their encounters – accentuates and augments “fetishistic power,” and thereby, more poignantly provokes and summons Frankenstein’s paternal duty to his creature.  For Frankenstein, however, the monster’s distorted visage produces a certain impenetrability that blocks and hampers any “intersubjective intercourse” between the two.  Thus, according to Juenguel’s ethics of physiognomy, the fact that Frankenstein escapes from the monster’s proffered hand during this “face-to face” encounter holds him that much more accountable and unethical. 

I find this essay intriguing and valuable in investigating and understanding the subtle and powerful impact of the portrait imagery deployed in Frankenstein.  Moreover, Juengel’s ethics of physiognomy – the ethics of reading/misreading only what is visible and external (even among the elite scientists) – is interesting and informative because it discloses human’s irrational, biased tendencies in evaluating one’s physicality.

Power of Chinese Ideographic Characters

Power of Chinese Ideographic Characters

In “Languages and Writing,” John P. Hughes claims that if alphabetic principle of writing was not invented, then, the history of mankind would be different” (716):

If we did not have the alphabet, it would be impossible to hope for universal literacy, and therefore (if Thomas Jefferson’s view was correct) for truly representative government.  Writing could have been kept a secret art known only to a privileged few or to a particular social class which would thus have an undue advantage over the others.  Information could not nearly so easily be conveyed from nation to nation, and the levels of civilization achieved by the Romans and ourselves might still only be goals to strive for. (716)

 In his essay, Hughes lays out the disadvantages of Chinese ideographic language, to support his above-mentioned claims.  He states that Chinese native scholars need seven years to learn to read and write Chinese and over 80 percent of the native speakers of Chinese are illiterate in their own language.  However, since the time of his essay (1962), China has undergone a drastic – political and economical – reformation and has become the focal point of the world’s attention.  Today, China’s national literacy rate certainly isn’t 20%; and contrary to Hughes claims, China’s non-alphabetic language has served its nation superbly by acting as a universal unifier among the different Chinese dialects.  China’s ideographic written language enables exchange of information and speeds proliferation of ingenious ideas among over a billion of its people, and is the prime reason for the nation’s successes in many fronts, nationally and internationally.

I lived in Taipei for five years learning Chinese from TLI Language Institute, and from the professors and classmates, I have learned the following personal observations: A study was done by TLI Language Institute of Taiwan and its results revealed interesting advantages to ideographic Chinese-characters.  The study involved two groups of students:  Chinese students learning English, and Native English speakers learning Chinese.  In this study, the point of interest was the speed of learning a foreign language by the two differing groups of students.

Chinese students learning English were extremely fast in the beginning, and slowed down remarkably after they have reached the intermediate level.  The ease of learning twenty-six alphabets and its seemingly logical grammar for the simple conversational sentences seemed scientific in the beginning.  However, continuation of further learning of English proved that English grammar and its morphology are far from being rational.  The students were daunted with the never-ending vocabulary lists that were resistant to long-term memory since the spelling of English words do not evoke mental pictures or emotions, nor does it have a logical explanation to why a certain group of alphabets mean what they claim to mean.  Therefore, the students found out that learning English is scientific only up to the phonetic level, but on a semantic level it was worst than superstition!  They must memorize, memorize, and memorize!  The intermediate level students learning English were proud that in such a short amount of period, they were able to make sounds out of unintelligible groups of alphabets, but soon were overwhelmed and often discouraged by the fact that learning a higher level of English, basically, meant pure memorization which they will forget the next day!

Not surprisingly, it was almost impossible for the Native English speakers to master 1000 Chinese characters in one year.  In fact, the school would not have been in business of teaching Chinese to foreigners if they had not heavily depended on the “Ping Ing” system (phonetics for foreigners).  However, the students, on their second year (on an average), upon their mastery of 500 Chinese characters, their speed of learning increased impressively; most of them were able to speak almost-fluent Mandarin.  Moreover, though most of them couldn’t remember all the strokes in Chinese characters yet, and still far from being able to write them manually, were able to recognize the correct characters from the word choices offered in the word processor and thus were able to write essays in Chinese with the help of the computer.  When the students were faced with an unfamiliar word, their trained mind in the history of ancient pictorial-representation of the Han Zi automatically leapt to form a mental perception of the word.  Thereby, the students didn’t have to rely purely on memorization; instead, because of the nature of Chinese Characters, their minds were involuntarily inspired to form images, ideas, and concepts to make inferences.  Hence, because Chinese characters were ideographic, after the students reached an intermediate level of Chinese, their speed of new word acquisition was much faster than that of their counterparts, whose learning of new English words primarily depended on one method – irrational memorization.

China, a nation rich in culture and history uses the non-alphabetic principle of writing yet its language in many ways is more efficient and powerful than the Indo-European Language: Information from one dialect to another, and from one nation to another are easily conveyed because its ideographic characters are indiscriminately accepted and understood by all dialects including Korea and Japan.  Why? Because historically, Korean and Japanese, as a language, were considered a dialect of Chinese, and not a foreign language: Korea and Japan, in their earlier part of history, had been using Chinese characters.  Korean’s Han Gul and Japanese’s Kan Ji are relatively a modern invention to simplify Han Zi (Chinese characters).  However Korean and Japanese are still very dependent on the original form of Han Zi to clarify meanings of homonyms in their language.  For example, approximately 30% (personal assessment) of Han-Gul printed on the newspapers must supply Han Zi in parenthesis to clarify and define the meaning of the word.  Therefore, Han Zi is still a required course for all Korean students (Junior high and above).  Consequently, Han Gul cannot stand alone as a complete alphabetic system of written language for Korean unless a better system is invented.  Meanwhile, Asia’s three economic giants, China, Japan, and Korea, amply enjoy the benefits of Chinese ideograms, the Han Zi, to freely exchange ingenious ideas to further fortify their amazing civilization of 5000 years.

China’s rising literacy rate proves that alphabetic principle of writing has no relevance to Hughes ideology of “no universal literacy without the alphabets”; rather, the statistics indicate that a nation’s economic well-being – though not exclusively – has a profound influence to the literacy of its citizens.  Figure 1, a chart by the World health Organization (World health Report 1999, pp.84-87) lists the literacy rate by countries in Asia; and strikingly, it shows China to be enjoying a high literacy rate of 80%!  Why?  Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows that China’s booming economy might be the main contributing factor to its rising literacy rate.  These charts clearly indicate that the literacy rate of China advances parallel to that of its nation’s economic growth – suggesting that for a nation to reach universal literacy, its economic standing must support it.

Figure 1:Asia Country (1)	Percentage of adults who are literate	Figure 6: Latin Am & Caribbean	Country (1)	Percentage of adults who are literate, 1995
Afghanistan	32		Anguilla	—
Bangladesh	38		Antigua and Barbuda	95
Bhutan	42		Argentina	96
Brunei	89		Aruba	—
Burma	—		Bahamas, The	96
Cambodia	65		Barbados	97
China	80		Belize	70
Taiwan	94		Bolivia	82
Hong Kong	94		Brazil	83
India	50		British Virgin Islands	—
Indonesia	84		Cayman Islands	—
Iran	71		Chile	95
Japan	–		Colombia	90
Laos	57		Costa Rica	95
Macau	–		Cuba	96
Malaysia	84		Dominica	—
Maldives	95		Dominican Republic	82
Mongolia	83		Ecuador	89
Nepal	36		El Salvador	76
North Korea	–		French Guiana	—
Pakistan	39		Grenada	96
Philippines	94		Guadeloupe	—
Singapore	91		Guatemala	65
South Korea	97		Guyana	98
Sri Lanka	90		Haiti	44
Thailand	94		Honduras	70
Vietnam	91		Jamaica	85
			Martinique	—
			Mexico	89
			Montserrat	—
			Netherlands Antilles	—
			Nicaragua	66
			Panama	91
			Paraguay	92
			Peru	88
			Puerto Rico	—
			Saint Kitts and Nevis	90
			Saint Lucia	—
			Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	82
			Suriname	93
			Trinidad and Tobago	98
			Turks and Caicos Islands	—
			Uruguay	97
			Venezuela	91
			Virgin Islands	—

The Figure 3 (from the UNDP statistical data 04/19/2000 on Human development index) further supports the link between a nation’s literacy rate versus nation’s economic standing: For example Canada, HDI rank of 1 (of 174), has the highest literacy rate of 99%; and Ethiopia, HDI rank of 171, only has 36.3% literacy rate.  Therefore, to simply claim that the reason Canada enjoys almost 100% literacy is due to its alphabetic language would be ignoring the obvious pattern.  The statistics (Figure 4 & 5) clearly demonstrate that there are undeniable links between the two factors: nation’s economic standing and its level of literacy. 

Figure 2 China: Social and Political Trends

China’s literacy rate has been rising rapidly and is by far the best of any developing region.

Figure 3

China: Economic Trends

(http://mars3.gps.caltech.edu/whichworld/explore/china/chinasoc.html).

 

Figure 4

 

Human development index
HDI rank (of 174)		Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998	Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US$) 1998	Life expectancy index	Education index	GDP index	Human development index (HDI) value 1998	GDP per capita (PPP US$) rank minus HDI rank
1	Canada	79,1	99,0	100	23.582	0,90	0,99	0,91	0,935	8
75	Saudi Arabia	71,7	75,2	57	10.158	0,78	0,69	0,77	0,747	-32
119	Egypt	66,7	53,7	74	3.041	0,69	0,60	0,57	0,623	-11
138	Kenya	51,3	80,5	50	980	0,44	0,70	0,38	0,508	18
143	Sudan	55,4	55,7	34	1.394	0,51	0,48	0,44	0,477	0
149	Djibouti	50,8	62,3	21	1.266	0,43	0,49	0,42	0,447	-2
159	Eritrea	51,1	51.7	27	833	0.43	0,44	0,35	0,408	0
171	Ethiopia	43,4	36,3	26	574	0,31	0,33	0,29	0,309	-1
UNDP statistical data 04/19/2000 on Human development index

 

Figure 5

Human development index
HDI rank (of 174)		Life expectancy at birth (years) 1998 rank	Adult literacy rate (% age 15 and above) 1998 rank	Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio (%) 1998 rank	GDP per capita (PPP US$) 1998 rank	female economic activity rate (age 15 and above)		health indicators
						rate (%) 1998	as % of male rate 1998	doctors (per 100.000 people)	public expenditure on health as % of GDP 1996-1998	% HIV/AIDS (adults 15-49)
1	Canada	3	10	6	9	59.6	80.6	221	6.4%	0.33%
75	Saudi Arabia	64	116	126	43	20.1	24.9	166	6.4%	0.01%
119	Egypt	112	147	62	107	34.0	43.2	202	1.8%	0.03%
138	Kenya	146	107	134	155	75.5	84.0	15	2.2%	11.64%
143	Sudan	134	145	157	142	34.0	39.8	10	3.2%	0.99%
149	Djibouti	149	137	173	147	…..	…..	20	…..	10.30%
159	Eritrea	148	149	163	159	74.8	86.7	2	2.9%	3.17%
171	Ethiopia	168	168	166	170	57.5	67.3	4	1.6%	9.31%
UNDP statistical data 04/19/2000 on Human development index & UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS) and WHO (World Health Organization)

Finally, Guatemala’s relatively a low literacy rate of (65%) from figure 6. negate Hughes belief, that Alphabets are the precursors to universal literacy.  Though the country’s language is Indo-European (alphabetic), it is still far from reaching the level of literacy that China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore (all predominantly Mandarin speaking countries) now enjoy.  All the statistical data (Figure 1-6) and my personal observations from Taiwan resonate one truth: that alphabetic system of writing does not guarantee universal literacy.  China, a home of nearly a quarter of the world’s population, and the third largest and the fastest growing economy, still a poor country by any standard, has accomplished so much so quickly that one wonders whether the secret to its success is its unique principle of writing – the Han Zi, its ideographic symbols.

Sources:

World health Report. Chart. 1999, pp.84-87

http://mars3.gps.caltech.edu/whichworld/explore/china/chinasoc.html

China: Social and Political Trends. Chart.  http://mars3.gps.caltech.edu/whichworld/explore/china/chinasoc.html

 China: Economic Trends. Chart.

http://mars3.gps.caltech.edu/whichworld/explore/china/chinasoc.html

Human development index. Chart. UNDP statistical data 04/19/2000.

http://home.planet.nl/~hans.mebrat/eritrea-economy.htm

Speech Codes: Do they lessen Racism?

Speech Codes: Do they lessen Racism?

  “Despite the tremendous strides resulting from civil rights legislation, racism remains one of the most pressing social problems in the US” (Marcus, Mullins, et al., p.1). Universities are not immune to racism.  “Racial issues are significant in all aspects of campus life including admissions, curriculum, sports, social interaction, and residence halls” (Marcus, Mullins, et al., p.1).  In recent years, attempts to curtail racially discriminatory activities have let many campuses to be focused on the institution of speech codes.  Currently, throughout the US, many universities have adopted and now enforce speech codes.  However, whether the institution of speech codes does help fight against racism is a grave and complicated question.  While speech codes on campuses might curb racial slurs uttered openly, they may never help eradicate the invisible undercurrent of hatred in the dominant race towards minorities.  In fact, with the implementation of speech codes, the fear of being identified as a racist can often lead to repressed emotions that simmer covertly producing aggravated effects.  In order to effectively lessen racism on campuses, speech codes must be handled with sensitivity and fairness requiring the both majority and the minority groups to share the responsibility of enhancing the present situation.

It is natural for humans of all races to identify with what they perceive to be their own.  We were taught as a class that “provincialism is a tendency to identify with the ideas, interests, and kinds of behavior favored by those in groups with which we identify” (Kahane & Cavender, p.123).  This tendency restricts social interactions between members of different racial groups.  Ethnic clustering in the snack area clearly demonstrates this point.  When students from any given campus resist mingling with members of other race, this creates an overall lack of communications and feelings of distrust between groups.    According to one report, whites saw ethnic clustering negatively, as racial segregation, while minorities valued it as a source of support within an unsupportive culture (Marcus, Mullins, et al., p.2).  Is it fair, then, to accuse only the whites of being racist when the members of minority groups sometimes resist association with the majority and insist on hibernating within their own culture?  Should not the burden and responsibility of lessening racism on campuses also be put on the efforts required by the members of minority groups?

“Provincialism” and “herd instincts” can often lead to prejudices (Kahane & Cavender, p.122). Lack of information or education about other cultures will make people vulnerable to forming opinions solely based on conventional stereotypes.  It is fair to assume that some of the overt expressions of racist remarks may be stemming from people’s “partisan mind set” due to unfamiliarity as to other races and cultures (Kahane & Cavender,  p.126).  Cultural prejudices due to lack of exposure can only be understood by venturous spirits of students who willingly and actively share their ideologies and values with groups of people other than their own.   Since prejudice is an intrinsic element of racism, in order to effectively curb racism, campuses should find ways to first discourage prejudices among students by offering incentives to those who are willing to go an extra mile to crack down that cultural ignorance. Likewise, in the efforts to reduce racism on campuses, administrators and educators should do their share by placing primary emphasis on educating the impressionable minds of the students rather than strictly enforcing the rigid speech codes.  

“Communication can facilitate greater understanding and empathy between all races and is quite possibly the best defense against the corrosive effects of modern racism” (Marcus, Mullins, et al., p.7).  Many times the real reason behind racism is the lack of understanding and communication rather than hatred.  School administrators and educators should strive to provide an educational habitat in their institutions and their classrooms into a blossoming cultural community by inviting and engaging the students into open debates and discussions about racism.  For the campus administrators to be even more committed towards this end, they should mandate certain cultural classes to be taken by the students as a part of the college curriculum.  This would be a sensible and a more effective way to fight against racism on campuses.  Unfortunately, the above-mentioned suggestions would only be possible if the movers and shakers of the campuses were exempt from being a racist themselves, for many of the research findings show that professors and school administrators are not immune to racism.

In order for the speech codes to yield any positive results against racism, it must be fundamentally and ideologically fair and just and need to be implemented wisely.  It is critical and would be more constructive for the administrators to adopt a “system of reward” for the initiators and active participants of such a harmonious cause, rather than dutifully abiding by the punitive stipulations they have set against the offenders of speech codes.  If this measure is taken too harshly, it will only exacerbate the present situation of racism on campuses.  It is equally crucial to make certain that speech codes to be inclusive of all offensive and impolite language spoken on campuses, rather than exclusively punishing only the racial slurs while overlooking all other disparaging remarks spoken against other social minority groups such as homosexuals, physically disabled, anorexic or obese people to name a few.  Shouldn’t all offensive language on the campuses be discouraged?  By instituting speech codes against racism in particular, the racism itself will be heightened.  If a person makes one mistake and is found guilty by the speech code and is suspended or expelled from the campus, the likelihood of that person’s racism becoming even more severe and dangerous is easily foreseen.  The chance of that person who receives retribution under the code to be repentant of his misdeed is slim.  Rather, it is more likely that this person’s vengeance against the system will harbor more harm for the society as a whole than good.  Then, what’s the point?  Do punishments of improper speeches lead to positive results?  I say nay.

“Americans have moved from open hostility and aggressive racism to a more subdued, covert, and even unconscious form of racism” (Sydell, Nelson, p.1).  Chapter seven of our textbook has acquainted us with the “cognitive” and “emotive” meanings of language (Kahane & Cavender, p.150).  People nowadays are too clever to get themselves into trouble by blurting out racial remarks that are politically incorrect or have negative emotive charges.  Instead, we use “euphemism” or circumlocution by intelligently and deliberately choosing neutral or positive overtones to cover our innermost negative feelings (Kahane & Cavender, p.152).  Therefore, it is harder to detect racism by any verbally spoken words.  “Although Civil Rights reforms in the 1960s inaugurated an era of forced semi-equality between the races, it may be that emotion and cognitions cannot be legislated” (Sydell, Nelson, p.1).  So, how can we even fathom that a speech codes can get rid of racism on campuses?  Speech codes will make prudent students close their lips to the truth underneath their conscious minds, but it is utterly inadequate if it is to subvert their streams of thoughts and feelings. 

Racism – that is, any doctrine or cognition that claims the superiority of one race over another – has evolved slowly over the entire history of mankind.  Though it is true that much more can be done to reduce the causes of racism, complete eradication of the existing racism is unrealistic because it would be impossible to educate and persuade the entire population of America about racism.   Besides, certain prejudices against members of other groups may be stemming from the need for people to find “scapegoats” for what they perceive to be the ills of the world (Kahane & Cavender, p.125), for example, taxes and special programs for the minority, resentment against affirmative action, tightened job markets due to influx of immigration, economic recession and so forth.  As long as any one or more of these issues persist, racism will likely accompany them.  Though we must maintain our optimism and continue to pursue equality among all races, our hopes in such an endeavor should not naively astray us by unrealistic fancies.  After all the possible measures against racism have been implemented, ultimately it is up to the flow of time to bring us results.  Patience and diligence will be required from both sides – majority and the minority groups – to bear fruits of our concerted efforts.  However, even after being patient and diligent over a long period of time, probability of completely eliminating racism in America (or anywhere else, for that matter) is unreal, for racism is embedded too deeply in the very fabrics of human minds. 

        It is important that the issues of racial inequality in campuses are not ignored but they need to be addressed with sensible measures.  Supporters of speech codes must bear in their minds the limits pertaining to the enactment of speech codes, since modern racism is not often audible, making it harder to detect.  Speech codes can help reduce the problem only if it is ideologically sound and just.  Racism is too intricately woven into our society.  Complete annihilation of it is less likely, but there is plenty more we can do to improve the situation.  Under the guidance of committed campus administrators and educators, the students from both sides (the majority and minority) of the groups can strive to come to a respectful union of the diverse cultures.  According to Dr. Raymond A. Winbush’s remark, “At the end of the day, it will be the measure of how well an institution educates its students for future service to this country and the world, which really matters” (Dr. Raymond, p.3,4).  The American universities are going through dramatic changes.  Distance learning is becoming a reality and quite common in most of the universities in U.S.  International study is more common and thus exchanges between faculty and students abroad are increasing.  The campuses of America, by educating its students the harmful effects of racism, not only will contribute to the harmoniously functioning universities, but more significantly, they will be serving the global world by preparing our students to be ready of the diverse cultural forces that are out there to meet them.